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Abstract
This paper proposes the meeting of fuzzy logic with paraconsistency
in a very precise and foundational way. Specifically, in this paper we
introduce expansions of the fuzzy logic MTL by means of primitive
operators for consistency and inconsistency in the style of the so-called
Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). The main novelty of the present
approach is the definition of postulates for this type of operators over
MTL-algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family
of logics, expansions of MTL, whose degree-preserving counterpart are
paraconsistent and moreover LFIs.
1 Introduction
The well-known Sorites paradox is representative of the problems arising
from the use of vague predicates, that is, predicates whose extension is
unclear such as ‘tall’ and ‘bald’. According to Charles S. Peirce,
A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things
concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they
been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them
as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically uncer-
tain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of
the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of language were
indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition
as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. ([25])
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Besides being an instigating topic for Philosophy, vagueness is also stud-
ied from the mathematical and logical point of view. For instance, the so-
called Mathematical Fuzzy Logic (MFL), inspired by the paradigm of Fuzzy
Set Theory introduced in 1965 by L. Zadeh (cf. [28]), studies the question of
vagueness from a foundational point of view based on many-valued logics.
In this sense, MFL can be considered as a degree-based approach to vague-
ness.1 Some systems like  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del-Dummett infinitely valued
logics are, just like fuzzy sets, valued over the real interval [0, 1]. This sup-
ports the idea of MFL being as a kind of foundational counterpart of fuzzy
set theory (which is a discipline mainly devoted to engineering applications).
The book [19] by P. Ha´jek is the first monograph dedicated to a broad study
of the new subject of MFL. In that book the so-called Basic fuzzy logic BL
is introduced as the residuated many-valued logic with the semantics on
the real unit interval induced by all continuous t-norms and their residua.
BL generalizes three prominent fuzzy logics,  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del-Dummet
and Product logics, each one capturing the semantics determined by three
particular continuous t-norms, namely  Lukasiewicz, minimum and product
t-norms respectively. The so-called Monoidal t-norm based logic) MTL was
introduced in [16] as a generalization of BL to capture the semantics in-
duced by left continuous t-norms and their residua, in fact, as it was proved
in [23] the theorems of MTL correspond to the common tautologies of all
many-valued calculi defined by a left-continuous t-norm and its residuum.
This logic, the most general residuated fuzzy logic whose semantics is based
on t-norms, will be the starting point of our investigations in the present
paper.
Frequently, vagueness is associated to a phenomenon of ‘underdetermi-
nation of truth’. However, vagueness could be seen from an opposite per-
spective: if a is a borderline case of a vague predicate P , the sentences ‘a is
P ’ and ‘a is not P ’ can be both true (at least to some extent). This leads
to an interpretation of vagueness as ‘overdetermination of truth’, instead of
underdetermination. Being so, a sentence A and its negation can simultane-
ously be both true, without trivializing (as much we assume that not every
sentence is true). This perspective, known as Paraconsistent Vagueness,
connects vagueness to the subject of Paraconsistent Logic (see, for instance,
[22] and [13]).
Paraconsistency is devoted to the study of logic systems with a negation
operator, say ¬, such that not every contradictory set of premises {ϕ,¬ϕ}
trivializes the system. Thus, any paraconsistent logic contains at least a con-
tradictory but non-trivial theory. There exist several systematic approaches
to paraconsistency, for instance: N. da Costa’s hierarchy of C-sytems Cn,
for n > 0, introduced in 1963 (see [14]); Relevance (or Relevant) logics,
1See e.g. [10] for several discussions on degree-based approaches (and in particular
fuzzy logic approaches) to vagueness.
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introduced by A. Anderson and N. Belnap in 1975 (see [1]); the Adaptive
Logics programme, developed by D. Batens and his group; R. Routley and
G. Priest’s philosophical school of Dialetheism, with Priest’s logic LP as its
formalized counterpart (see, for instance, [26]); and the Logics of Formal In-
consistency (LFIs), introduced by W. Carnielli and J. Marcos in 2000 (see [7]
and [6]), and also studied e.g. by Avron et al. [3, 2]. The main characteristic
of the latter logics is that they internalize in the object language the notions
of consistency and inconsistency by means of specific connectives (primitive
or not). This constitutes a generalization of da Costa’s C-systems.
The present paper proposes the meeting of fuzzy logic with paracon-
sistency in a very precise and foundational way. Specifically, we introduce
extensions of the fuzzy logic MTL by means of primitive operators for con-
sistency and inconsistency, defining so LFIs based on (extensions of) MTL.
An important feature of this approach is that the LFIs defined in this man-
ner are not based on (positive) classical logic, as in the case of most LFIs
studied in the literature, including da Costa’s C-systems. In particular, the
LFIs proposed here do not satisfy the law of excluded middle: ϕ∨¬ϕ is not
a valid schema, in general.
The main novelty of the present approach is the definition of postulates
for primitive consistency and inconsistency fuzzy operators over the algebras
associated to (extensions of) MTL; in particular, we show how to define
consistency and inconsistency operators over MTL-algebras. This general-
izes the previous approach to fuzzy LFIs introduced in [15], where it was
shown that a consistency operator can be defined in MTL4, the expansion
of MTL with the Monteiro-Baaz projection connective 4. However, this
consistency operator is not primitive, but it is defined in terms of the oper-
ator 4 together with other operators of MTL. At this point, it is important
to observe that MTL, as well as its extensions, are not paraconsistent logics,
provided that the usual truth-preserving consequence relation is considered:
from {ϕ,¬ϕ} every other formula can be derived. On the other hand, if a
degree-preserving consequence relation is adopted, MTL as well as some of
its extensions become paraconsistent (see Section 2).
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, the basic
notions about fuzzy logics and LFIs are introduced. Then Section 4 contains
the main definitions and technical results. In particular, we introduce the
notion of consistency operators on MTL-algebras and axiomatize several
classes of them as expansions of MTL. In this framework, the question
about how the consistency operator propagates with respect to the MTL
connectives is studied in Section 5. In its turn, in Section 6 we propose a
fuzzy LFI able to recover classical logic by considering additional hypothesis
on the consistency operator. The dual case of inconsistency operators is
briefly analyzed in Section 7. We end up with some concluding remarks in
Section 8.
3
2 Preliminaries I: truth-preserving and degree-
preserving fuzzy logics
In the framework of Mathematical Fuzzy Logic there are two different fam-
ilies of fuzzy logics according to how the logical consequence is defined,
namely truth-preserving and degree-preserving logics. In this section we
review the main definitions and properties of these two families of logics.
Truth-preserving fuzzy logics. Most well known and studied systems
of mathematical fuzzy logic are the so-called t-norm based fuzzy logics, cor-
responding to formal many-valued calculi with truth-values in the real unit
interval [0, 1] and with a conjunction and an implication interpreted respec-
tively by a (left-) continuous t-norm and its residuum respectively, and thus,
including e.g. the well-known  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del infinitely-valued logics,
corresponding to the calculi defined by  Lukasiewicz and min t-norms respec-
tively. The weakest t-norm based fuzzy logic is the logic MTL (monoidal
t-norm based logic) introduced in [16], whose theorems correspond to the
common tautologies of all many-valued calculi defined by a left-continuous
t-norm and its residuum [23].
The language of MTL consists of denumerably many propositional vari-
ables p1, p2, . . ., binary connectives ∧,&,→, and the truth constant 0. For-
mulas, which will be denoted by lower case greek letters ϕ,ψ, χ, . . ., are
defined by induction as usual. Further connectives and constants are defin-
able; in particular, ¬ϕ stands for ϕ → 0, 1 stands for ¬0, ϕ ∨ ψ stands for
((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ)∧((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ), and ϕ↔ ψ stands for (ϕ→ ψ)∧(ψ → ϕ).
A Hilbert-style calculus for MTL was introduced in [16] with the following
set of axioms:
(A1) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(A2) ϕ& ψ → ϕ
(A3) ϕ& ψ → ψ & ϕ
(A4) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ
(A5) ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ
(A6) ϕ& (ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ ∧ ψ
(A7a) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ& ψ → χ)
(A7b) (ϕ& ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))
(A8) ((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ)
(A9) 0→ ϕ
and whose unique rule of inference is modus ponens: from ϕ and ϕ → ψ
derive ψ.
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MTL is an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [4] and its
equivalent algebraic semantics is given by the class of MTL-algebras, that is
indeed a variety; call it MTL. MTL-algebras can be equivalently introduced
as commutative, bounded, integral residuated lattices 〈A,∧,∨,&,→, 0, 1〉
further satisfying the following prelinearity equation:
(x→ y) ∨ (y → x) = 1.
Given an MTL-algebra A = 〈A,∧A,∨A,&A,→A, 0A, 1A〉, an A-
evaluation is any function mapping each propositional variable into A,
e(0) = 0A and such that, for formulas ϕ and ψ, e(ϕ ∧ ψ) = e(ϕ) ∧A e(ψ);
e(ϕ∨ψ) = e(ϕ)∨Ae(ψ); e(ϕ&ψ) = e(ϕ)&Ae(ψ); e(ϕ→ ψ) = e(ϕ)→A e(ψ).
An evaluation e is said to be a model for a set of formulas Γ, if e(γ) = 1A
for each γ ∈ Γ.
We shall henceforth adopt a lighter notation dropping the superscript
A. The distinction between a syntactic object and its interpretation in an
algebraic structure will always be clear by the context.
The algebraizability gives the following strong completeness theorem:
For every set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulas, Γ `MTL ϕ iff for every A ∈ MTL
and every A-evaluation e, if e is a model of Γ then e is a model of ϕ
as well.
For this reason, since the consequence relation amounts to preservation of
the truth-constant 1, MTL can be called a (full) truth-preserving logic.
Actually, the algebraizability is preserved for any logic L that is a
(finitary) expansion of MTL satisfying the following congruence property
(Cong) ϕ→ ψ,ψ → ϕ `L c(χ1, . . . , χi, ϕ, χi+2, . . . , χn)
→ c(χ1, . . . , χi, ψ, χi+2, . . . , χn)
for any possible new n-ary connective c and each i < n. These expan-
sions, that we will call core expansions of MTL (in accordance with [11]),
are in fact Rasiowa-implicative logics (cf. [27]). As proved in [12], every
Rasiowa-implicative logic L is algebraizable and, if it is finitary, its equiv-
alent algebraic semantics, the class L of L-algebras, is a quasivariety. Ax-
iomatic expansions of MTL, i.e. without any further inference rule, satisfying
(Cong) are called core fuzzy logics in the literature (see e.g. [12]), and their
associated quasi-varieties of algebras are in fact varieties.
As a consequence, any logic L which is a core expansion of MTL, in
particular any core fuzzy logic, enjoys the same kind of the above strong
completeness theorem with respect to the whole class of corresponding L-
algebras. But for core fuzzy logics we can say more than that. Indeed, for
any core fuzzy logic L, the variety of L-algebras can also be shown to be
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generated by the subclass of all its linearly ordered members [12].2 This
means that any core fuzzy logic L is strongly complete with respect to the
class of L-chains, that is, core fuzzy logics are semilinear.
All core fuzzy logics enjoy a form of local deduction theorem. As usual,
ϕn will be used as a shorthand for ϕ& n. . . &ϕ, where ϕ0 = 1. Using this
notation one can write the following local deduction theorem for any core
fuzzy logics L: for each set of formulas Σ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} the following holds:
Σ, ϕ `L ψ iff there is n ≥ 0 such that Σ `L ϕn → ψ.
Interesting axiomatic extensions of MTL used in the paper are the ones
given in Table 2, but first we list in Table 1 the axioms needed to define
these extensions of MTL.
Axiom schema Name
¬¬ϕ→ ϕ Involution (Inv)
¬ϕ ∨ ((ϕ→ ϕ&ψ)→ ψ) Cancellation (C)
ϕ→ ϕ&ϕ Contraction (Con)
ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ&(ϕ→ ψ) Divisibility (Div)
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ 0 Pseudo-complementation (PC)
(ϕ&ψ → 0) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ&ψ) Weak Nilpotent Minimum (WNM)
Table 1: Some usual axiom schemata in fuzzy logics.
MTL can be considered in fact as the logic of left-continuous t-norms [23]
and BL as the logic of continuous t-norms [8], in the sense that theorems
of these logics coincide with common tautologies of interpretations on the
MTL (respectively BL) chains defined on the real unit interval [0, 1] by left-
continuous (respectively continuous) t-norms and their residua.
Another interesting family of fuzzy logics are the so-called logics of a
(left-continuous) t-norm. Given a left-continuous t-norm ∗, define the real
(or standard) algebra [0, 1]∗ = ([0, 1],min max, ∗,→∗, 0, 1) where →∗ is the
residuum of ∗. Then define the logic of the t-norm ∗ as the logic L∗ whose
(semantical) notion of consequence relation is as follows: ϕ is a consequence
of a set of formulas Γ iff for every evaluation v over [0, 1]∗ such that v(γ) = 1
for each γ ∈ Γ, then v(ϕ) = 1. When ∗ is a continuous t-norm, L∗ has been
proved finitely axiomatizable as extension of BL (see [18]).
2 Moreover, for a number of core fuzzy logics, including MTL, it has been shown that
their corresponding varieties are also generated by the subclass of MTL-chains defined
on the real unit interval, indistinctively called in the literature as standard or real chains.
For instance, MTL is also complete wrt real MTL-chains, that are of the form [0, 1]∗ =
〈[0, 1], min, max, ∗,→∗, 0, 1〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉, where ∗ denotes a left-continuous t-
norm and →∗ is its residuum [23].
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Logic Additional axiom schemata References
Strict MTL (SMTL) (PC) [20]
Involutive MTL (IMTL) (Inv) [16]
Weak Nilpotent Minimum (WNM) (WNM) [16]
Nilpotent Minimum (NM) (Inv) and (WNM) [16]
Basic Logic (BL) (Div) [19]
Strict Basic Logic (SBL) (Div) and (PC) [17]
 Lukasiewicz Logic ( L) (Div) and (Inv) [19]
Product Logic (Π) (Div) and (C) [21]
Go´del Logic (G) (Con) [19]
Table 2: Some axiomatic extensions of MTL obtained by adding the cor-
responing additional axiom schemata, and the references where they have
been introduced (in the context of fuzzy logics).
As we have mentioned, all the axiomatic expansions of MTL (i.e. all
core fuzzy logics) are semilinear and enjoy the local deduction detachment
theorem. Another very interesting class of fuzzy logics arise from the
(non-axiomatic) expansion of MTL with the Monteiro-Baaz projection
connective 4, obtaining again a finitary Rasiowa-implicative semilinear
logic MTL4. Indeed, MTL4 is axiomatized by adding to the Hilbert-style
system of MTL the deduction rule of necessitation (from ϕ infer 4ϕ) and
the following axiom schemata:
(41) 4ϕ ∨ ¬4ϕ
(42) 4(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (4ϕ ∨4ψ)
(43) 4ϕ→ ϕ
(44) 4ϕ→44ϕ
(45) 4(ϕ→ ψ)→ (4ϕ→4ψ)
Then, one analogously defines the class of 4-core fuzzy logics as the
axiomatic expansions of MTL4 satisfying (Cong) for any possible new con-
nective. They satisfy the global deduction theorem in the following way: for
any 4-core fuzzy logic L, and each set of formulas Σ∪ {ϕ,ψ}, the following
holds:
Σ, ϕ `L ψ iff Σ `L 4ϕ→ ψ.
Semilinearity can also be inherited by many expansions of (4-)core fuzzy
logics with new (finitary) inference rules. Indeed, in [12] it is shown that an
expansion L of a (4-)core fuzzy logic is semilinear iff for each newly added
finitary inference rule
(R) from Γ derive ϕ,
its corresponding ∨-form
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(R∨) from Γ ∨ p derive ϕ ∨ p
is derivable in L as well, where p is an arbitrary propositional variable not
appearing in Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
In this paper we will use the following notions of completeness of a logic
L with respect to the class real L-chains. Although we will mainly focus on
core fuzzy logics, we formulate them for the more general case of logics that
are semilinear expansions of MTL whose class of real L-chains is non-empty.
Definition 2.1 (RC, FSRC, SRC) Let L be a semilinear core expansion
of MTL and let R be the class of real L-chains, i.e. L-chains whose support
is the real unit interval [0, 1]. We say that L has the (finitely) strong R-
completeness property, (F)SRC for short, when for every (finite) set of
formulas T and every formula ϕ it holds that T `L ϕ iff e(ϕ) = 1A for each
A-evaluation such that e[T ] ⊆ {1A} for every L-algebra A ∈ R. We say
that L has the R-completeness property, RC for short, when the equivalence
is true for T = ∅.
Of course, the SRC implies the FSRC, and the FSRC implies the RC.
The SRC and FSRC have traditionally been proved for many fuzzy logics
by showing an embeddability property, namely by showing in the first case
that every countable L-chain is embeddable into a chain of R, and in the
second case by showing that every countable L-chain is partially embeddable
into a chain of R (i.e. for every finite partial algebra of a countable L-chain
there is a one-to-one mapping into some L-chain over [0, 1] preserving the
defined operations). In [9] it was shown that, for (∆-)core fuzzy logics
these sufficient conditions are also necessary (under a weak condition). This
was further generalized in [12], where Cintula and Noguera show that these
conditions are also necessary for a more general class of logics, including
semilinear core expansions of MTL.
Theorem 2.2 ([9, 12] Characterization of completeness properties)
Let L be a semilinear core expansion of MTL. Then:
• L has the SRC iff every countable L-chain is embeddable into some
chain of R.
• If the language of L is finite, then L has the FSRC iff every countable
L-chain is partially embeddable into some chain of R.
Degree-preserving fuzzy logics. It is clear that (4-)core fuzzy logics,
like MTL, are (full) truth-preserving fuzzy logics. But besides the truth-
preserving paradigm that we have so far considered, one can find an alter-
native approach in the literature. Given a (4-)core fuzzy logic L, and based
on the definitions in [5], we can introduce a variant of L that we shall denote
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by L≤ , whose associated deducibility relation has the following semantics:
for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ `L≤ ϕ iff for every L-chain A, every
a ∈ A, and every A-evaluation v, if a ≤ v(ψ) for every ψ ∈ Γ, then a ≤ v(ϕ).
For this reason L≤ is known as a fuzzy logic preserving degrees of truth, or
the degree-preserving companion of L. In this paper, we often use generic
statements about “every logic L≤ ” referring to “the degree-preserving com-
panion of any (4-)core fuzzy logic (or even of any semilinear core expansion
of MTL) L”.
As regards to axiomatization, if L is a core fuzzy logic, i.e. with Modus
Ponens as the unique inference rule, then the logic L≤ admits a Hilbert-style
axiomatization having the same axioms as L and the following deduction
rules [5]:
(Adj-∧) from ϕ and ψ derive ϕ ∧ ψ
(MP-r) if `L ϕ→ ψ (i.e. if ϕ→ ψ is a theorem of L), then from ϕ derive
ψ
Note that if the set of theorems of L is decidable, then the above is in fact
a recursive Hilbert-style axiomatization of L≤ .
In general, let L be a semilinear core expansion of MTL with a set of
new inference rules,
(Ri) from Γi derive ϕi, for each i ∈ I.
Then L≤ is axiomatized by adding to the axioms of L the above two inference
rules plus the following restricted rules
(Ri-r) if `L Γi, then derive ϕi.
Moreover, if L is a 4-core fuzzy logic, then the only rule one should add
to L≤ is the following restricted necessitation rule for 4:
(4-r) if `L ϕ, then derive 4ϕ.
The key relationship between L and L≤ is given by the following equiv-
alence: for any formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ, it holds
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `L≤ ψ iff `L (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)→ ψ.
This relation points out that, indeed, deductions from a finite set of premises
in L≤ exactly correspond to theorems in L. In particular, both logics share
the same theorems: `L ϕ iff `L≤ ϕ. Moreover, this also implies that if L′
is a conservative expansion of L, then L′≤ is also a conservative expansion
of L≤ .
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3 Preliminaries II: logics of formal inconsistency
Paraconsistency is the study of logics having a negation operator ¬ such that
it is not explosive with respect to ¬, that is, there exists at least a formula
ϕ such that from {ϕ,¬ϕ} it does not follow any formula. In other words,
a paraconsistent logic is a logic having at least a contradictory, non-trivial
theory.
Among the plethora of paraconsistent logics proposed in the literature,
the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), proposed in [7] (see also [6]), play
an important role, since they internalize in the object language the very
notions of consistency and inconsistency by means of specific connectives
(primitives or not).3 This generalizes the strategy of N. da Costa, which
introduced in [14] the well-known hierarchy of systems Cn, for n > 0. Besides
being able to distinguish between contradiction and inconsistency, on the one
hand, and non-contradiction and consistency, on the other, LFIs are non-
explosive logics, that is, paraconsistent: in general, a contradiction does not
entail arbitrary statements, and so the Principle of Explosion (for all ϕ,ψ
it holds ϕ,¬ϕ ` ψ) does not hold. However, LFIs are gently explosive, in
the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then
contradictoriness does cause explosion: ©(ϕ), ϕ,¬ϕ ` ψ for every ϕ and
ψ. Here, ©(ϕ) denotes that ϕ is consistent. The general definition of LFIs
we will adopt here, slightly modified from the original one proposed in [7]
and [6], is the following:
Definition 3.1 Let L be a logic defined in a language L containing a nega-
tion ¬, and let ©(p) be a nonempty set of formulas depending exactly on
the propositional variable p. Then L is an LFI (with respect to ¬ and ©(p))
if the following holds (here, ©(ϕ) = {ψ[p/ϕ] : ψ(p) ∈ ©(p)} and ψ[p/ϕ]
denotes the formula obtained from ψ by replacing every occurrence of the
variable p by the formula ϕ):
(i) ϕ,¬ϕ 0 ψ for some ϕ and ψ, i.e., L is not explosive w.r.t. ¬;
(ii) ©(ϕ), ϕ 0 ψ for some ϕ and ψ;
(iii) ©(ϕ),¬ϕ 0 ψ for some ϕ and ψ; and
(iv) ©(ϕ), ϕ,¬ϕ ` ψ for every ϕ and ψ, i.e., L is gently explosive w.r.t. ¬
and ©(p).
In the case that ©(ϕ) is a singleton (which will be the usual situation),
its element will we denoted by ◦ϕ, and ◦ will be called a consistency operator
in L with respect to ¬. A consistency operator can be primitive (as in the
3We should warn the reader that in the frame of LFIs, the term consistency is used
to refer to formulas that basically exhibit a classical, explosive behaviour rather than for
referring to formulas being (classically) satisfiable.
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case of most of the systems treated in [7] and [6]) or, on the contrary, it can
be defined in terms of the other connectives of the language. For instance, in
the well-known system C1 by da Costa, consistency is defined by the formula
◦ϕ = ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) (see [14]).
Given a consistency operator ◦, an inconsistency operator • is naturally
defined as •ϕ = ¬◦ϕ. In the stronger LFIs, the other way round holds, and
so ◦ can be defined from a given • as ◦ϕ = ¬ • ϕ.
All the LFIs proposed in [7] and [6] are extensions of positive classical
logic, therein called CPL+. The weaker system considered there is called
mbC, defined in a language containing ∧, ∨, →, ¬ and ◦, and it is obtained
from CPL+ by adding the schema axioms ϕ∨¬ϕ and ◦ϕ→ (ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ψ)).
As we shall see in the next section, the definition of LFIs can be gen-
eralized to the algebraic framework of MTLs, constituting an interesting
approach to paraconsistency under the perspective of LFIs, but without the
requirement of being an extension of CPL+.
4 Axiomatizating expansions of paraconsistent
fuzzy logics with consistency operators ◦
As observed in [15], truth preserving fuzzy logics are not paraconsistent
since from ϕ,¬ϕ we obtain ϕ&¬ϕ, that is equivalent to the truth-constant
0, and thus they are explosive. However in the case of degree-preserving
fuzzy logics, from ϕ,¬ϕ one cannot always derive the truth-constant 0, and
hence there are paraconsistent degree-preserving fuzzy logics. Indeed we
have the following scenario.
Proposition 4.1 Let L be a semilinear core expansion of MTL. The fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1. L is explosive, and hence it is not paraconsistent
2. L≤ is paraconsistent iff L is not pseudo-complemented, i.e. if L does
not prove the law ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
The proof of the second item is easy since ϕ,¬ϕ `L≤ 0 does not hold
only in the case L does not prove (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) → 0, or in other words, only in
the case L is not an expansion of SMTL.
As a consequence, from now on L will refer to any semilinear core expan-
sion of MTL which is not a SMTL logic (not satisfying axiom (PC)). Indeed
we are interested in the expansion with a consistency operator ◦ of a logic
L≤ (when L is not a SMTL logic). In order to axiomatize these expansions,
we need first to axiomatize the expansion of the truth-preserving L with
such an operator ◦ and from them, as explained in Section 2, we can then
obtain the desired axiomatizations.
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4.1 Expansions of truth-preserving fuzzy logics with consis-
tency operators ◦
Having in mind the properties that a consistency operator has to verify in
a paraconsistent logic (recall Definition 3.1), and taking into account that
any semilinear core expansion of MTL is complete with respect to the chains
of the corresponding varieties, it seems reasonable to define a consistency
operator over a non-SMTL chain A as a unary operator ◦ : A→ A satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) x ∧ ◦(x) 6= 0 for some x ∈ A;
(ii) ¬x ∧ ◦(x) 6= 0 for some x ∈ A;
(iii) x ∧ ¬x ∧ ◦(x) = 0 for every x ∈ A.
Such an operator ◦ can be indeed considered as the algebraic counterpart
of a consistency operator in the sense of Definition 3.1. Actually, we can
think about the value ◦(x) as denoting the (fuzzy) degree of ‘classicality’
(or ‘reliability’, or ‘robustness’) of x with respect to the satisfaction of the
law of explosion, namely x ∧ ¬x = 0.
Let us have a closer look at how operators ◦ on a non-SMTL chain sat-
isfying the above conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) may look like. Let us consider
the set N(A) = {x ∈ A \ {1} | ¬x = 0}. Notice that either N(A) = ∅ (for
example, this is the case of IMTL chains) or N(A) ∈ {[a, 1), (a, 1)} where
a =
∧
N(A). If x /∈ N(A) ∪ {0, 1} then by (iii) we have ◦(x) = 0. Thus
since ¬(x) = 0 for x ∈ N(A), (ii) implies that ◦(0) > 0. On the other
hand by (i), ◦(x) > 0 for some x ∈ N(A) ∪ {1}. Therefore, any opera-
tor ◦ verifying (i), (ii) and (iii) must satisfy the following minimal conditions:
◦(0) > 0,
◦(x) = 0, if x ∈ (0, 1) \N(A)
◦(x) > 0, for some x ∈ N(A) ∪ {1}
However, since in our setting the intended meaning of ◦(x) is the (fuzzy)
degree of ‘classicality’ or ‘reliability’, or ‘robustness’ of x, we propose the
following stronger postulates for such a consistency operator on non-SMTL
chains A:
(c1) If x ∧ ¬x 6= 0 then ◦(x) = 0;
(c2) If x ∈ {0, 1} then ◦(x) = 1;
(c3) If ¬x = 0 and x ≤ y then ◦(x) ≤ ◦(y).
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Clause (c1) just guarantees that condition (iii) for consistency operators
is satisfied by ◦. In the classical case, both truth-values 0 and 1 satisfy
the explosion law x ∧ ¬x = 0 and so ◦(x) = 1 for every truth-value x.
Since ◦ intends to extend the classical case, clause (c2) reflects this situation
(another justification for (c2) is that 0 and 1 are classical truth-values with
fuzzy degree 1). Moreover, clause (c2) ensures that conditions (i) and (ii) for
consistency operators are satisfied. Finally, clause (c3) ensures the coherency
of ◦: in N(A), the segment of the chain where ◦ is positive, the consistency
operator ◦ is monotonic, in accordance with the idea that ◦(x) is the fuzzy
degree of classicality, from the perspective of the explosion law: “the closer
is x to 1, the more classical is x”. In Figure 1, we depict in blue (dashed-
line) the graph of the negation ¬ in the real BL-chain [0, 1]∗, where * is the
ordinal sum of  Lukasiewicz t-norm in [0, a] and another arbitrary t-norm on
the interval [a, 1] and in red (bold line) the graph of a ◦ operator compatible
with the above postulates.
0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  
1	  
a	  
0	  
¬(x)
◦(x)
Figure 1: Graph of the negation in a BL-algebra of the form [0, a] L ⊕ [a, 1]∗
and a graph of a ◦ operator satisfying postulates (c1), (c2) and (c3).
As a consequence, we propose the following definition.
Definition 4.2 Let L be any semilinear core expansion of MTL. Given
an axiomatization of L, we define the logic L◦ as the expansion of L in a
language which incorporates a new unary connective ◦ with the following
axioms:
(A1) ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ)
(A2) ◦1¯
(A3) ◦0¯
and the following inference rules:
(Cong)
(ϕ↔ ψ) ∨ δ
(◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ) ∨ δ (Coh)
(¬¬ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∨ δ
(◦ϕ→ ◦ψ) ∨ δ
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Due to the presence of the rule (Cong), L◦ is a Rasiowa-implicative logic,
and thus it is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, and its algebraic
semantics is given by L◦-algebras.
Definition 4.3 L◦-algebras are expansions of L-algebras with a new unary
operation ◦ satisfying the following conditions, for all x, y, z ∈ A:
(◦1) x ∧ ¬x ∧ ◦(x) = 0
(◦2) ◦(1) = ◦(0) = 1
(◦3) if (¬¬x ∧ (x→ y)) ∨ z = 1 then (◦(x)→ ◦(y)) ∨ z = 1
Thus, the class L◦ of L◦-algebras is a quasivariety, and since it is the
equivalent algebraic semantics of the logic L◦, L◦ is (strongly) complete
with respect to L◦. But since the inference rules (Cong) and (Coh) are
closed under ∨-forms, we know (see Section 2) that L◦ is also semilinear and
hence it is complete with respect to the class of L◦-chains.
Proposition 4.4 (Chain completeness) The logic L◦ is strongly com-
plete with respect to the class of L◦-chains.
It is worth pointing out that the above conditions on ◦ in a linearly
ordered L◦-algebra faithfully capture the three intended properties (c1)-
(c3) that were required to such ◦ operator at the beginning of this section.
Indeed, one can easily show the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Let A be a L-chain and let ◦ : A → A a mapping. Then ◦
satisfies conditions (c1), (c2) and (c3) iff A expanded with ◦ is a L◦-chain.
Proof: The implication from left to right is immediate since each condition
(ci) implies condition (◦i) for i = 1, 2, 3, actually (c2) = (◦2). For the other
direction, it is enough to observe that in a chain it holds that x ∧ y = 0 iff
x = 0 or y = 0, and x ∨ y = 1 iff either x = 1 or y = 1. Then it is obvious
that (◦1) and (◦3) are indeed equivalent to (c1) and (c3) respectively. 2
Example 4.6 (1) Let L be the logic of a t-norm which is an ordinal sum
of a  Lukasiewicz component and a Go¨del component with an idempotent
separating point 0 < a < 1 (a non-SMTL chain denoted  L ⊕ G such that
N( L ⊕ G) = [a, 1)). Then an ◦ operator in the corresponding standard
algebra is any function ◦ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that :
(i) ◦(x) = 1 if x ∈ {0, 1},
(ii) ◦(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0, a) (where x ∧ ¬x 6= 0),
(iii) ◦ is not decreasing in N( L⊕G) = [a, 1) (where ¬x = 0).
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Therefore there are as many consistency operators as non-decreasing func-
tions over the interval [a, 1] with values in [0, 1].
(2) Let L =  L be  Lukasiewicz logic, i.e. the logic of the  Lukasiewicz t-
norm complete with respect to the standard chain [0, 1] L. Since the negation
is involutive, we have N([0, 1] L) = ∅, and thus there is a unique ◦ operator
definable on the  Lukasiewicz standard chain: the one defined as ◦(x) = 1 if
x ∈ {0, 1}, and ◦(x) = 0 otherwise.
We can now prove that the logic L◦ is a conservative expansion of L in
the following strong sense.
Proposition 4.7 (Conservative expansion) Let L be the language of L.
For every set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of L-formulas, Γ `L◦ ϕ iff Γ `L ϕ.
Proof: One implication is trivial. For the other one, assume that Γ 0L ϕ.
Then there exists an L-chain A and an A-evaluation e such that e[Γ] ⊆ {1}
and e(ϕ) 6= 1. A can be expanded to an L◦-chain A′ e.g. by defining
◦(1) = ◦(0) = 1 and ◦(x) = 0 for every x ∈ A \ {0, 1}. Then A′ and e
provide a counterexample in the expanded language showing that Γ 0L◦ ϕ.
2
Theorem 4.8 (Strong real completeness) The logic L◦ has the SRC if,
and only if, L has the SRC.
Proof: Again, one implication just follows from the fact that L◦ is a conser-
vative expansion of L. For the converse one assume that L has the SRC. We
have to show that any countable L◦-chain can be embedded into a standard
L◦-chain. Let A be a countable L◦-chain. By Theorem 2.2, we know that
the ◦-free reduct of A is embeddable into a (standard) L-chain B on [0, 1].
Denote this embedding by f and define ◦′ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] in the following
way:
(i) ◦′(0) = ◦′(1) = 1
(ii) ◦′(x) = 0 for x such that x > 0 and ¬x > 0.
(iii) ◦′ restricted to the interval {x ∈ (0, 1) | ¬x = 0} is defined as ◦′(z) =
sup{f(◦(x)) : x ∈ A, f(x) ≤ z}
So defined, ◦′ is non-decreasing on {x ∈ [0, 1] : ¬x = 0} such that ◦′(f(x)) =
f(◦(x)) for any x ∈ A and hence B expanded with ◦′ is a standard L◦-chain
where A is embedded. 2
Taking into account that for a (semilinear core expansion of MTL) logic
L being finite strong real completeness is equivalent to the fact that every
countable L-chain is partially embeddable into some L-chain over [0, 1] (see
Theorem 2.2), the following corollary can be easily proved by the same
technique used in the above Theorem 4.8.
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Corollary 4.9 (Finite strong standard completeness) A logic L has
the FSRC if, and only if, L◦ has the FSRC.
4.2 Some interesting extensions of the logics L◦
As shown in the examples above of operators ◦ in L◦-chains A, these op-
erators are completely determined over the set {x ∈ A : x ∧ ¬x 6= 0},
but they can be defined in different ways in the interval where ¬x = 0. In
this section we first consider adding a consistency operator ◦ to logics whose
associated chains have no elements x < 1 such that ¬x = 0 (chains A such
that N(A) = ∅). These logics can be obtained from any L by adding a suit-
able inference rule, and will be denoted as L¬¬. In the second subsection
we focus on logics L◦ where ◦ is crisp, and in particular we consider the two
extremal cases of these operators, namely those such that ◦(x) = 0 for all
x ∈ N(A) and those such that ◦(x) = 1 for all x ∈ N(A).
4.2.1 The case of L¬¬ logics with ◦ operators
In this subsection we study the case of logics L◦ whose associated L-chains
are those where ¬x = 0 necessarily implies that x = 1. First, from a logic L
we will define the logic L¬¬ and then we will add the consistency operator.
The logic L¬¬ is defined as the extension of L by adding the following
rule:
(¬¬) ¬¬ϕ
ϕ
Obviously L¬¬ is complete with respect to the corresponding quasi-
variety of L¬¬-algebras, that is, the class of L-algebras satisfying the quasi-
equation “If ¬¬x = 1 then x = 1”, or equivalently the quasi-equation “If
¬x = 0 then x = 1”.
Remark 4.10 In general, the class of L¬¬-algebras is not a variety. For
instance, in [24] it is proved that the class of weak nilpotent minimum al-
gebras satisfying the quasi-equation ¬x = 0 ⇒ x = 1 is a quasi-variety that
is not a variety. For instance, take the WNM-chain C over the real unit
interval defined by the negation:
n(x) =

1− x if x ∈ [0, 15 ] ∪ [45 , 1]
1
5 , if x ∈ [35 , 45 ]
4
5 − x, if x ∈ [15 , 35 ]
Take the filter F = [45 , 1]. Then an easy computation shows that the quotient
algebra C/ ≡F is isomorphic to the standard WNM-chain CF defined by the
negation:
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nF (x) =

0, if x ∈ [23 , 1]
2
3 − x, if x ∈ (0, 23 ]
Clearly {x ∈ C : ¬x = 0} = {1} but {x ∈ CF : ¬x = 0} 6= {1}, i.e.
C belongs to the quasi-variety of WNM¬¬-algebras but CF does not, so the
class of L¬¬-algebras is not closed by homomorphisms.
Moreover L¬¬ is a semilinear logic since it satisfies the following propo-
sition.
Lemma 4.11 The following rule
(¬¬)∨ ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ
ϕ ∨ δ
is derivable in L¬¬.
Proof: Since δ → ¬¬δ is a theorem of MTL, it is clear that ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ `L
¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬δ, and so ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ `L ¬¬(ϕ ∨ δ) as well. Then, by using the rule
(¬¬) we have that ϕ ∨ δ is derivable in L¬¬ from the premise ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ. 2
Corollary 4.12 (Chain completeness) The logic L¬¬ is semilinear and
thus strongly complete with respect to the class of L¬¬-chains.
Proof: Since the inference rule (¬¬) is closed under ∨-forms, we know that
L¬¬ is also semilinear (see Section 2) and hence it is complete with respect
to the class of L¬¬-chains 2
Remark 4.13 Obviously, if L is an IMTL logic (i.e. a logic where its nega-
tion is involutive), then L¬¬ = L. Also, for interested readers, we could
notice that BL¬¬ is actually  Lukasiewicz logic  L since the only BL-chains
satisfying the quasi-equation “if ¬x = 0 then x = 1” are the involutive
BL-chains, i.e MV-chains. This is not the case for MTL¬¬ which is not
equivalent to IMTL (see the WNM logic defined in the previous remark,
that satisfy rule (¬¬) and it is not IMTL.).
Now we add the consistency operator ◦ to the logic L¬¬. By this we mean
to expand the language with an unary connective ◦ and to add the axioms
(A1), (A2) and (A3) and the inference rules (Cong) and (Coh). Obviously,
the resulting logic L¬¬◦ is complete with respect to the quasi-variety of L¬¬◦ -
algebras and with respect to the class of chains of the quasi-variety. The
completeness theorems with respect to real chains also apply to L¬¬◦ . More-
over we can easily prove that the following schemes and inference rule are
provable and derivable respectively in L¬¬◦ :
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(B1) ¬◦ϕ ∨ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ,
(B2) ◦(ϕ↔ ψ)→ (◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ),
(B3) ◦(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ◦ϕ ∨ ψ,
(B4) ◦0¯
(◦Nec) ϕ◦ϕ
These properties allows us to provide a simpler axiomatization of L¬¬◦ .
Theorem 4.14 L¬¬◦ can be axiomatized by adding to the axiomatization of
L¬¬ the axioms (B1)-(B4) and the rule (◦Nec).
Proof: Let us denote by L+◦ the resulting new system in the expanded lan-
guage with ◦ obtained from L¬¬ by adding the axioms (B1)-(B4) and the
rule (◦Nec). The axioms (B1)-(B4) and the rule (◦Nec) are clearly sound
wrt L¬¬◦ -algebras. Thus we need only to prove that axioms of L¬¬◦ are prov-
able in the new system L+◦ , and that the rules (Cong) and (Coh) are also
admissible in L+◦ . It is obvious that from (B1) we can obtain (A1), since
¬◦ϕ ∨ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ implies ¬◦ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and the latter is equivalent to (A1).
(A2) is an easy consequence of rule (◦Nec), and (A3) is (B4). Thus it only
remains to prove that (Cong) and (Coh) are derivable in L+◦ (in what follows
` stands for `L+◦ ).
On the one hand, from (ϕ↔ ψ)∨δ, using rule (◦Nec), we obtain ◦((ϕ↔
ψ)∨δ), and by (B3) and MP, ◦(ϕ↔ ψ)∨δ. Finally, by (B2), MP and taking
into account the monotonicity of ∨, we get (◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ)∨ δ. Hence (Cong) is
derivable.
On the other hand, from ¬¬ϕ∨δ and (ϕ→ ψ)∨δ, using (¬¬)∨, we obtain
ϕ ∨ δ and (ϕ → ψ) ∨ δ, and thus (ϕ ∨ δ)&((ϕ → ψ) ∨ δ) as well. Therefore
by properties of &, we get (ϕ&((ϕ → ψ) ∨ δ)) ∨ (δ&((ϕ → ψ) ∨ δ)), and
by MP and monotonicity for &, we obtain ψ ∨ δ. Now, by (◦Nec) it follows
◦(ψ ∨ δ) and by (B3), ◦ψ ∨ δ. Since MTL proves the schema α → (β → α)
then ◦ψ → (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ) is a theorem of L+◦ . Thus, by monotonicity of ∨ and
modus ponens, we obtain (◦ϕ → ◦ψ) ∨ δ. Therefore (Coh) is a derivable
rule in MTL¬¬◦ , and hence in L¬¬◦ as desired. 2
Taking into account that L¬¬◦ is chain-complete, it is interesting to check
how operators ◦ can be defined in a L¬¬-chain A. Indeed, since in this case
N(A) = ∅, the ◦ operator is completely determined and defined as:
◦(x) =
{
1, if x ∈ {0, 1}
0, otherwise
The interested reader will have observed that such an operator can also
be defined in the algebras of the logic L4 (the expansion of L with the
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Monteiro-Baaz 4 operator) as ◦(x) = 4(x ∨¬x) (cf. [15]). And conversely,
in L¬¬◦ -algebras the4 operator is also definable as4x = ◦(x)∧x. Therefore
the following result is easy to prove using chain completeness results for both
logics.
Corollary 4.15 L¬¬◦ -algebras and (L4)¬¬-algebras are termwise equivalent,
hence the logics L¬¬◦ and (L4)¬¬ themselves are equivalent.
As a consequence, let us mention that, unlike L¬¬, the class of L¬¬◦ -
algebras is always a variety, since this is clearly the case of (L4)¬¬: in-
deed, the rule (¬¬) can be equivalently expressed in (L4)¬¬ as the axiom
4(¬¬ϕ)→ ϕ.
4.2.2 Logics with crisp consistency operators: minimal and max-
imal consistency operators
As previously observed, the consistency operator ◦ is non-decreasing in the
segments of the chains where ¬x = 0, producing a kind of ‘fuzzy degree of
classicality’. In the previous section we have analyzed a special case where
the operator ◦ is crisp in the sense that it takes only the values 0 and 1.
The aim of this section is to study the general case where ◦ is crisp.
Definition 4.16 Let Lc◦ be the logic obtained from L◦ by adding the follow-
ing axiom:
(c) ◦ϕ ∨ ¬◦ϕ
A Lc◦-algebra A is a L◦-algebra such that ◦(x) ∨ ¬◦(x) = 1 for every x ∈ A.
Since it is an axiomatic extension of the logic L◦, it turns out that Lc◦
is algebraizable, whose equivalent algebraic semantics is given by the quasi-
variety of Lc◦-algebras, and semilinear as well, and thus complete with respect
the class of Lc◦-chains. From the definition above, it is clear that the operator
◦ in any Lc◦-chain A is such that ◦(x) ∈ {0, 1} for every x ∈ A. Moreover,
this implies that the set {x ∈ A \ {0} : ◦(x) = 1} is an interval containing
N(A) ∪ {1}.
Let us consider now the logics corresponding to the minimal and maximal
(pointwisely) consistency operators, as announced in the introduction of
Section 4.2. First, consider Lmin◦ to be the axiomatic extension of the logic
L◦ with the following axiom:
(A4) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬◦ϕ
Since it is an axiomatic extension of L◦, Lmin◦ is complete with respect to the
class of Lmin◦ -chains, i.e. L◦-chains satisfying the equation x∨¬x∨¬◦(x) =
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1. One can readily check that the equation x ∨ ¬x ∨ ¬◦(x) = 1 holds in
an L◦-chain only in the case that ◦(x) = 0 when 0 < x < 1. Indeed, if
min(x,¬x) > 0 it is clear that ◦(x) has to be 0, while if x < 1 and ¬x = 0
then (A4) forces ¬◦(x) = 1, that is ◦(x) = 0. Therefore, the ◦-operator in
any Lmin◦ -chain is completely determined, and it is indeed the (pointwisely)
minimal one definable in a L◦-chain.
Proposition 4.17 The logic Lmin◦ is complete with respect to the class of
Lmin◦ -chains, i.e. L◦-chains where the ◦ operator is the minimal one.
Since Lmin◦ are a special kind of Lc◦-chains, this proposition yields that
Lmin◦ must be an axiomatic extension of Lc◦. Moreover, it turns out that, for
all x in a Lmin◦ -chain, ◦(x) coincides with 4(x ∨ ¬x), where 4 is the Baaz-
Monteiro projection operator, as it happened in the case of L¬¬◦ -chains.
Using the fact that both logics Lmin◦ and L4 are chain-complete, it follows
that they are inter-definable.
Proposition 4.18 The logics Lmin◦ and L4 are inter-definable by means of
the following translations:
(i) from Lmin◦ to L4: define 4ϕ as ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ
(ii) from L4 to Lmin◦ : define ◦ϕ as 4(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
By (ii) of the above proposition ◦ϕ is equivalent to the formula4(ϕ∨¬ϕ)
in L4. Thus by axiom (41) the following result (proving the axiom of Lc◦)
is obvious.
Lemma 4.19 Lmin◦ proves the axiom (c), i.e. ◦ϕ ∨ ¬◦ϕ.
Finally, consider the logic Lmax◦ to be the extension of the logic L◦ with
the following inference rule:
(¬¬◦) ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ◦ϕ ∨ δ
Again, since (¬¬◦)∨ is closed under disjunction, Lmax◦ is complete with
respect to Lmax◦ -chains, i.e. L◦-chains where the following condition holds:
if ¬x = 0 then ◦(x) = 1. Since ◦(x) = 0 for all x > 0 such that ¬x > 0, then
it is clear that ◦ is completely determined in such a chain and defined as:
◦(x) = 0 if 0 < x ∧ ¬x and ◦(x) = 1 otherwise (i.e. if x ∈ {0, 1} or ¬x = 0).
Hence ◦ is the maximal (pointwisely) consistency operator definable in a
L-chain.
Proposition 4.20 The logic Lmax◦ is complete with respect to the class of
Lmax◦ -chains, i.e. L◦-chains where the ◦ operator is the maximal one.
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As a final remark, we notice that in case L is an extension of the basic
fuzzy logic BL, the above rule (¬¬◦) can be equivalently replaced by the
following axiom:
(¬¬ϕ→ ϕ) ∨ ◦ϕ
Indeed, it is not difficult to check that, given the special features of nega-
tions in BL-chains, a consistency operator ◦ in a BL-chain A satisfies this
axiom iff ◦(x) = 0 for x such that 0 < min(x,¬x) and ◦(x) = 1 otherwise.
Therefore, the quasivariety of Lmax◦ -algebras is in fact a variety when L is a
BL-extension, but whether the class of Lmax◦ -algebras is a variety in a more
general case remains as an open problem.
Figure 2 gathers the axiomatizations (relative to L) of the logic L◦ and
of the different extensions we have defined in Section 4.2.
Remark 4.21 Taking into account the graphs of the ◦ operators on real
chains associated to the logics L¬¬◦ , Lc◦, Lmin◦ and Lmax◦ (see Figure 2), and
the proof of conservativeness of L◦ with respect to L in Proposition 4.7, it is
clear that the same kind of proof also applies to all these extensions of L◦.
Hence L¬¬◦ is a conservative expansion of L¬¬ and Lc◦, Lmin◦ and Lmax◦ are
conservative expansions of L.
4.3 Axiomatizing paraconsistent fuzzy logics L≤ with ◦
As mentioned in the introduction of this section we know that the only para-
consistent fuzzy logic are the logics L≤ when L is not an SMTL logic. Thus
our ultimate goal is the axiomatization of the expansion of paraconsistent
logics L≤ with a consistency operator ◦, that will be denoted L≤◦ . But from
results of this section we know how to axiomatize the logics L◦ and, as shown
in Section 2 we know how to get an axiomatization of L≤◦ from the one of
L◦. Indeed the axiomatization of L≤◦ is obtained by taking the same axioms
of L◦ and adding the following inference rules:
(Adj-∧) from ϕ and ψ deduce ϕ ∧ ψ
(MP-r) if `L◦ ϕ → ψ (i.e. if ϕ → ψ is a theorem of L◦), then from ϕ
derive ψ
(Cong-r) if `L◦ (ϕ↔ ψ) ∨ δ then derive (◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ) ∨ δ
(Coh-r) if `L◦ (¬¬ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∨ δ then derive (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ) ∨ δ
In the same way we could obtain axiomatizations of the logics L≤◦ when
L is any of the logics studied in this section. Then axiomatizations of the
logics (L¬¬◦ )≤, (Lc◦)≤, (Lmin◦ )≤ and (Lmax◦ )≤ are easily obtained. Figure 3
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Figure 2: Summary of the axiomatizations of the logics L◦, L¬¬◦ , Lc◦, Lmin◦ ,
Lmax◦ , and corresponding graphs of the operators ◦ on a standard BL-chain,
where 0 < a ≤ 1.
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gathers the inference rules of these logics (recall that the axioms coincide
with those of the corresponding truth-preserving logics). Therefore we have
defined and axiomatized a general family of LFIs based on fuzzy logics and
some of its extensions.
Logic Inference rules
L≤◦
rules of L≤ + (Cong-r)
`L◦ (ϕ↔ ψ) ∨ δ
(◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ) ∨ δ
(Coh-r)
`L◦ (¬¬ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∨ δ
(◦ϕ→ ◦ψ) ∨ δ
(L¬¬◦ )≤ rules of L≤◦ + (¬¬-r)
`L¬¬◦ ¬¬ϕ
ϕ
(Lc◦)≤ rules of L≤◦
(Lmin◦ )≤ rules of L≤◦
(Lmax◦ )≤ rules of L≤◦ + (¬¬◦-r)
`Lmax◦ ¬¬ϕ ∨ δ
◦ϕ ∨ δ
Figure 3: Summary of the inference rules of the logics L≤◦ , (L¬¬◦ )≤, (Lc◦)≤,
(Lmin◦ )≤ and (Lmax◦ )≤ .
Finally, recall that, as observed at the end of Section 2, if a logic L′ is
a conservative expansion of another L, then L′≤ is also a conservative ex-
pansion of L≤ . Therefore, taking into account Proposition 4.7 and Remark
4.21, we get the following immediate result.
Proposition 4.22 The logics L≤◦ , (Lc◦)≤, (Lmin◦ )≤ and (Lmax◦ )≤ are conser-
vative expansions of L≤, while (L¬¬◦ )≤ is a conservative expansion of (L¬¬)≤.
5 About the propagation property
One of the distinctive features of da Costa’s C-systems is the so-called prop-
agation property of the consistency connective ◦, which states that consis-
tency (or well-behavior, according to da Costa’s terminology) is propagated
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in the following sense: from ◦ϕ it follows ◦¬ϕ, and from {◦ϕ, ◦ψ} it follows
◦(ϕ#ψ), for every binary connective #. We can adapt this property to our
setting, and study conditions which ensure its validity.
Definition 5.1 Let L be a paraconsistent fuzzy logic with a consistency op-
erator ◦. Then we say that ◦ satisfies the propagation property in L with
respect to a subset X of connectives of the language of L if
◦ϕ1, . . . , ◦ϕn `L ◦#(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn),
for every n-nary connective # ∈ X and formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn built with con-
nectives from X.
Observe that in the case n = 0, # is a constant and that the above
condition requires `L ◦#.
The paraconsistent fuzzy logics studied in this paper are logics L≤◦ and
some extensions, where L is a truth-preserving fuzzy logic. Knowing the
relation between truth-preserving and degree-preserving fuzzy logics, ◦ sat-
isfies the propagation property in a logic L≤◦ with respect to some subset of
connectives X ⊆ {0,∧,&,→}4 whenever:{ `L◦ ◦0 if 0 ∈ X
`L◦ (◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ)→ ◦(ϕ#ψ), for each binary # ∈ X (Prop∗)
In such a case we will say that ◦ satisfies the propagation property (Prop*)
in the logic L≤◦ with respect to the set of connectives X. Actually since in
the logics L◦ we have `L ◦0, the first condition is always satisfied and it can
be dropped from (Prop*).
Proposition 5.2 The following conditions hold:
1. ◦ satisfies (Prop*) in any fuzzy logic L◦ with respect to the set of
primitive connectives {∧,→}.
2. ◦ satisfies (Prop*) in any fuzzy logic of the families L¬¬◦ , Lmin◦ or
Lmax◦ with respect to the set of primitive connectives {∧,&,→}.
Proof: Due to chain completeness of the logics involved, the whole proof
is done by algebraic means. Let A be a L◦-chain. The first item for the
connective ∧ is a consequence of the non-decreasing property of ◦ in A \ {0}
combined with the fact that ◦(0) = 1. Before dealing with the property
for →, we first consider the property for the negation ¬, that is proved by
cases. If x ∈ {0, 1} the property is obvious. If x ∈ N(A) then ¬x = 0, and
4We are assuming here to work with a core fuzzy logic, and in core fuzzy logics these
are the primitive connectives, the rest are definable from them.
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thus ◦(¬x) = 1 and the property obviously holds. Otherwise, if x does not
belong to the previous cases x∧¬x > 0 then ◦(x) = 0 and also the property
is obviously satisfied. Finally, for → the proof is easy since, remembering
that a residuated implication satisfies the inequality y ≤ x → y, assuming
y > 0 we have ◦(x) ∧ ◦(y) ≤ ◦(y) ≤ ◦(x→ y); if y = 0 then we are back to
the case of the negation.
For the second item we only need to deal with the case of &. First
observe that if ¬x = 0 and ¬y = 0, then ¬(x&y) = 0 as well, since ¬(x&y) =
(x&y) → 0 = x → (y → 0) = x → ¬y = x → 0 = ¬x = 0. Second observe
that in the chains of the considered logics, the image of ◦ is {0, 1}. From
there the proof is easy. If one of the values x, y is 0 or 1 the result is obvious.
If one of the values x, y is in (0, 1) \ N(A) then ◦(x) ∧ ◦(y) = 0, and the
implication is trivially valid. Finally if x, y ∈ N(A) the result follows from
the fact that ◦ is non-decreasing taking into account the first observation
above. 2
The first item of Proposition 5.2 can not be improved in the sense that
L◦ does not prove ◦(ϕ) ∧ ◦(ψ)→ ◦(ϕ&ψ), as the following example shows.
Example 5.3 Let L be the logic of the t-norm ⊗ that is the ordinal sum of
a  Lukasiewicz component and a product component, with 12 being the idem-
potent separating point. Then consider the L◦-chain where the consistency
operator ◦ is defined by ◦(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0, 34) and ◦(x) = 1 otherwise. Take
now x = 56 and y =
3
4 . Then
5
6 ⊗ 34 < 34 , and clearly ◦(x) = ◦(y) = 1 while
◦(56 ⊗ 34) = 0.
6 Recovering Classical Logic
In the context of LFIs, it is a desirable property to recover the classical
reasoning by means of the consistency connective ◦ (see [6]). Specifically, let
CPL be classical propositional logic. If L is a given LFI such that its reduct
to the language of CPL is a sublogic of CPL, then a DAT (Derivability
Adjustment Theorem) for L with respect to CPL is as follows: for every
finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} in the language of CPL, there exists a finite
set of formulas Θ in the language of L, whose variables occur in formulas of
Γ ∪ {ϕ}, such that
(DAT) Γ `CPL ϕ iff ◦(Θ),Γ `L ϕ.
When the operator ◦ enjoys the propagation property in the logic L with
respect to the classical connectives (see the previous section) then the DAT
takes the following, simplified form: for every finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
in the language of CPL,
(PDAT) Γ `CPL ϕ iff ◦p1, . . . , ◦pn,Γ `L ϕ
25
where {p1, . . . , pn} is the set of propositional variables occurring in Γ∪{ϕ}.
Here we are interested in investigating whether we can expect some form
of the (PDAT) for the logics L≤◦ and, as we have noted before, ◦ has the
propagation property iff certain formulas are theorems in L◦. Thus in terms
of theoremhood, to have a DAT when ◦ propagates in L≤◦ is equivalent to
prove the following:
(PDAT∗) `CPL ϕ iff `L◦
(
n∧
i=1
◦pi
)
→ ϕ iff
n∧
i=1
◦pi `L≤◦ ϕ
where {p1, . . . , pn} is the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ (ob-
viously, when this set is empty, that is, when n = 0, then
∧n
i=1 ◦pi is set
to be 1¯). Arguably, (PDAT) (or (PDAT∗)) is more interesting than (DAT).
For instance, the hierarchy (Cn)n≥1 of paraconsistent logics introduced by
da Costa satisfies (PDAT).
Since ◦ satisfies the propagation property in logics L◦ with respect to
the classical signature (cf. Proposition 5.2), we try to prove (PDAT*) for
them. However, in the general setting of logics L◦ (PDAT*) does not always
hold. Indeed it is easy to see that `CPL p ∨ ¬p but 0L◦ ◦p → (p ∨ ¬p),
i.e. ◦p → (p ∨ ¬p) is not a tautology over all L◦-chains. Take for example
the L◦-chain defined on a L-chain A by defining ◦ as follows: ◦(x) = 1 if
x ∈ {0, 1} ∪ N(A) and ◦(x) = 0 otherwise. Then it is easy to see that if
N(A) 6= ∅ then e(◦p → (p ∨ ¬p)) 6= 1 for any evaluation e on A such that
e(p) ∈ N(A).
This example is significative since the principle ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is enough to
collapse MTL-logic with classical logic. In fact we propose the following
definition.
Definition 6.1 Let Ldat◦ be the logic obtained from L◦ by adding the
following axiom:
(◦EM) ◦ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
By the same argument as above, Ldat◦ is algebraizable and its algebraic
semantics is given by the class of Ldat◦ -algebras.
Definition 6.2 A Ldat◦ -algebra A is a L◦-algebra such that ◦(x) ≤ x ∨ ¬x
for every x ∈ A.
Therefore Ldat◦ is complete with respect to the variety of Ldat◦ -algebras
and, more important, with respect to the chains of the variety (since the
logic is an axiomatic extension and thus it is semilinear as L◦).
Moreover since Ldat◦ extends L◦, it follows that ◦ satisfies the propagation
property in Ldat◦ with respect to the classical signature.
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However, since Ldat◦ does not satisfy contraction, property (PDAT*) will
be hardly satisfied: it should be intuitively clear that, in some situations, it
could be necessary to use the ‘consistency assumption’ (and so the law of
excluded middle) more than once in order to obtain a given tautology. We
show next that a slightly modified form of DAT indeed holds for Ldat◦ .
Proposition 6.3 The logic Ldat◦ satisfies the following form of DAT:
(PDAT∗∗) `CPL ϕ iff there is k ≥ 1 such that `Ldat◦
(
n∧
i=1
◦pi
)k
→ ϕ
where {p1, . . . , pn} is the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ and
ψk is as a shorthand for ψ& k. . . &ψ.
Proof: Let ϕ be a formula in the language of CPL and suppose that
p1, p2, . . . , pn are the propositional variables appearing in ϕ . If `CPL ϕ
then {pi ∨ ¬pi : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} `L ϕ, since for any evaluation e in
any L-chain, e(pi ∨ ¬pi) = 1 iff e(pi) is either 0 or 1. Then by the lo-
cal deduction-detachment theorem of L, there is a natural k such that
`L (
∧n
i=1(pi ∨ ¬pi))k → ϕ, and this theorem is also valid in Ldat◦ . Then,
by axiom (◦EM), this implies `Ldat◦ (
∧n
i=1 ◦pi)k → ϕ, and hence (PDAT∗∗)
holds.
Conversely, assume that `Ldat◦ (
∧n
i=1 ◦pi)k → ϕ for some k ≥ 1, and
let e be any evaluation on the 2-element Boolean algebra B2. Since B2
can be considered as a Ldat◦ -chain where ◦(0) = ◦(1) = 1, then we have
e((
∧n
i=1 ◦pi)k → ϕ) = 1. But then we necessarily have e(ϕ) = 1, because
e(
∧n
i=1 ◦pi) = 1. Therefore ϕ is a CPL-tautology and so `CPL ϕ. 2
An easy reasoning shows an analogous result when we have an arbitrary
set of premises built from a finite set of propositional variables:
Γ `CPL ϕ iff there is k ≥ 1 such that Γ `Ldat◦
(
m∧
i=1
◦pi
)k
→ ϕ
where now p1, . . . , pm are the propositional variables appearing in Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
One interesting question is to know examples where (PDAT∗∗) is only
true for some k ≥ 2. This is an open question in general but we have
the following illustrative example. Consider the formula ϕ = (p ∨ ¬p)k
with k > 1. Since in a logic L◦ both the weak and strong conjunctions
∧ and & are many-valued generalizations of the classical conjunction, it is
clear that (p ∨ ¬p)k is equivalent to the classical tautology p ∨ ¬p when we
restrict to Boolean evaluations. However there are extensions of BL logic
where(◦EM) is a tautology but ◦p → (p ∨ ¬p)k is not. For instance let L
be the logic of the BL-chain [0, 1] L⊕ L where  L⊕  L is the ordinal sum of two
27
copies of  Lukasiewicz standard algebra [0, 1] L, and let a be the idempotent
element separating the two components. Further, take the operator ◦ in
[0, 1] defined by ◦(0) = ◦(1) = 1, ◦(x) = x if x ∈ [a, 1], and ◦(x) = 0
otherwise. An easy computation shows that ◦p → (p ∨ ¬p)2 is already not
a tautology in Ldat◦ . Therefore, if we use & as conjunction symbol in the
language of CPL, (PDAT∗) is not valid in Ldat◦ , while obviously (PDAT∗∗)
is so. Nevertheless we have not been able to find a similar example when we
use ∧ as conjunction symbol the language of CPL.
Finally, notice that axiom (◦EM) is a theorem of the logics L¬¬◦ and
Lmin◦ . Therefore, in these logics ◦pi∨¬◦pi is a theorem, hence it is clear that
◦pi is equivalent to (◦pi)k for any k, and thus we have the following direct
corollary.
Corollary 6.4 Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a finite set of formulas in the language of
CPL and let {p1, . . . , pm} the set of propositional variables appearing in
Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Then
Γ `CPL ϕ iff Γ `L+◦
(
n∧
i=1
◦pi
)
→ ϕ
where + ∈ {¬¬,min}.
7 Inconsistency operators in the logic MTL
As recalled in Section 3, within the LFIs framework one can also consider
an inconsistency operator •, dual to the consistency operator ◦, where •ϕ
has the intended meaning of ¬◦ϕ (see [6]).
In this section we show how to add inconsistency operators to MTL-
algebras, as well as to its logical counterparts, based on the content of the
previous sections in terms of consistency operators.
Definition 7.1 Given a logic L that is a semilinear core expansion of MTL
but not SMTL, we define the logic L• as the expansion of L in a language
which incorporates a new unary connective • with the following axioms:
(A1’) ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ •ϕ
(A2’) ¬•1¯
(A3’) ¬•0¯
and the following inference rules:
(Cong’)
(ϕ↔ ψ) ∨ δ
(•ϕ↔ •ψ) ∨ δ (Coh’)
(¬¬ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∨ δ
(•ψ → •ϕ) ∨ δ
As in the case of L◦, due to the presence of the rule (Cong’), L• is a
Rasiowa-implicative logic, and thus it is also algebraizable in the sense of
Blok and Pigozzi and its algebraic semantics is given by L•-algebras.
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Definition 7.2 A L•-algebra A is an expansion of a L-algebra with a new
unary operation • : A→ A satisfying the following conditions for all x, y, z ∈
A:
(•1) ¬(x ∧ ¬x) ∨ •(x) = 1
(•2) •(1) = •(0) = 0
(•3) if (¬¬x ∧ (x→ y)) ∨ z = 1 then (•(y)→ •(x)) ∨ z = 1.
Again, since the rules (Cong’) and (Coh’) are closed under ∨-forms, L• is
complete with respect to the class of L•-chains. Obviously, the • operators
in L-chains have the dual form of the ◦ operators (described in Figure 1),
and we will not go into further details.
The intended duality between both operators ◦ and • is made explicit in
the following results.
Proposition 7.3 Let t be a translation map from the language of L◦ to the
language of L• which replaces ◦ by ¬•. Conversely, let t′ be the translation
map in the opposite direction, which replaces • by ¬◦. Then Γ `L◦ ϕ implies
that t(Γ) `L• t(ϕ) and Γ′ `L• ϕ′ implies that t′(Γ′) `L◦ t′(ϕ′).
Proof: It is enough to prove that: (i) the translation of each axiom of the
source logic can be derived in the target logic, and (ii) the translation of
each inference rule of the source logic is an inference rule which is derivable
in the target logic. The proof easily follows by using that in MTL the
following formulas are theorems: ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ → ¬¬ϕ and
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬ϕ). 2
Notice however that the above translations do not yield that both logics
are equivalent: indeed, the translations t and t′ are not in general each
other’s inverse. This is due to the fact that, e.g. in L◦, ◦ϕ in general is not
equivalent to ¬¬◦ϕ. However, in the frame of the logic Lc◦ and its extensions,
where ◦ϕ is Boolean, one can prove ◦ϕ↔ ¬¬◦ϕ, and one can establish their
equivalence with their •-dual corresponding logics. Notice that if L is an
IMTL logic (i.e. whose negation is involutive), then Lc◦ coincides with L◦
itself.
In particular, if we define dual counterparts of the logics L¬¬◦ , Lc◦, Lmin◦
or Lmax◦ as:
- L¬¬• : is the extension of L• with the rule “from ¬¬ϕ infer ϕ”
- Lc•: is the axiomatic extension of L• with the axiom •ϕ ∨ ¬•ϕ
- Lmax• : is the axiomatic extension of L• with the axiom ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ∨ •ϕ
- Lmin• : is the extension of L• with the rule “from ¬¬ϕ∨δ infer ¬•ϕ∨δ”
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then we can list the following equivalences (denoted by ≡) among logics
via the translations t and t′: L¬¬◦ ≡ L¬¬• , Lc◦ ≡ Lc•, Lmin◦ ≡ Lmax• and
Lmax◦ ≡ Lmin• .5 As a consequence, the (quasi) varieties associated to pairs of
equivalent logics are termwise equivalent.
To conclude, just to point out that, as in the case of the consistency
operators, the paraconsistent versions of the above logics with the inconsis-
tency operators • would correspond to their degree-preserving counterparts,
namely the logics L≤• , (L¬¬• )≤, (Lc•)≤, (Lmin• )≤ and (Lmax• )≤.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the possibility of defining paraconsistent
logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) based on systems of mathematical fuzzy
logic, in particular by first expanding axiomatic extensions of the fuzzy
logic MTL with the characteristic consistency and inconsistency operators
of LFIs, and then by considering their degree-preserving versions, that are
paraconsistent. Actually, in the same line of [15] and based on a novel
perspective, this paper intends to contribute to the study and understanding
of the relationships between paraconsistency and fuzziness.
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